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Abstract
Competition between two-sided platforms is shaped by the possibility of multihoming. If
users on both sides singlehome, each platform provides users on either side exclusive access
to its users on the other side. In contrast, if users on one side can multihome, platforms exert
monopoly power on that side and compete on the singlehoming side. This paper explores
the allocative effects of such a change from single- to multihoming. Our results challenge the
conventional wisdom, according to which the possibility of multihoming hurts the side that
can multihome, while benefiting the other side. This is not always true: the opposite may
happen or both sides may benefit.
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1 Introduction
Two-sided platforms cater to the tastes of two audiences—in many instances, buyers and sellers.
Decisions among these audiences are interdependent because of positive cross-group external
effects. One of the principle achievements of the literature on two-sided markets has been
to characterize the price structure and associated price distortions in alternative market en-
vironments. Competing platforms have to take into account the effect of a price change to
participation levels not only on the market side directly affected, but also indirect effects arising
from altered participation on the other side.
A possible market environment is that both sides singlehome. To reach a particular agent
on one side, an agent from the other side has to be on the same platform. If a platform lures
an agent from either side away from a competitor onto its site, this platform becomes more
attractive to agents on the other side, as more transaction partners become available on the
platform’s site and fewer partners are available on the competing site. Another possible market
environment is that agents on one side can multihome and agents on the other can singlehome.
This is the so-called competitive bottleneck, which has been described in these terms:
“Here, if it wishes to interact with an agent on the singlehoming side, the multi-
homing side has no choice but to deal with that agent’s chosen platform. Thus, plat-
forms have monopoly power over providing access to their singlehoming customers
for the multihoming side. This monopoly power naturally leads to high prices being
charged to the multihoming side, and there will be too few agents on this side being
served from a social point of view [...]. By contrast, platforms do have to compete
for the singlehoming agents, and high profits generated from the multihoming side
are to a large extent passed on to the singlehoming side in the form of low prices (or
even zero prices).” (Armstrong, 2006, pp. 669-670)
This insight has been appreciated and reproduced in various policy documents. For instance,
in a recent report, the German Cartel Office writes:1
“Armstrong analyses a constellation which he describes as competitive bottle-
necks with ‘one side applying singlehoming, the other one multihoming’. In this
scenario, the platforms were competing for users on the singlehoming side. Accord-
ingly, on the multihoming side, platforms provided monopolistic access to singlehom-
ing users who were members of the platform. Regarding the framework of the model
reviewed, this led to a monopolistic price on the multihoming side, while the price on
the singlehoming side would be fairly low as a result of platforms competing for users
on this side. In this respect, this may result in an inefficient price structure despite
potentially intensive platform competition (on the singlehoming side).” (BKartA,
2016, p. 58)
1Another instance is the statement by the European Commission in OECD (2009, p. 169).
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In this paper, we take a closer look at the price and surplus effects of multihoming. We
compare the competitive bottleneck to the two-sided singlehoming market environment. In the
latter, platforms compete on both sides of the market, whereas on the former they compete on
only one. One may therefore be tempted to conclude that an audience that obtains the possibility
to multihome faces higher prices and obtains a lower surplus, while the other audience faces lower
prices and obtains a higher surplus. Also, since in the competitive bottleneck, platforms compete
on only one side, one may expect that their profits are higher than in the market environment
in which both audiences singlehome. Yet, the effect of making one side multihome instead of
singlehome is less straightforward than what may in general be perceived. While it is true
that platforms exert monopoly power over the multihoming side, participants on this side may
actually benefit from multihoming.
As Evans and Schmalensee (2012, p. 16) observe,2 “in software platforms, for instance, the
price structure appears to be the opposite of what the competitive bottlenecks theory would
predict. Most personal computer users rely on a single software platform, while most developers
write for multiple platforms. Yet personal computer software providers generally make their
platforms available for free, or at low cost, to applications developers and earn profits from
the single-homing user side.” As our analysis will reveal, while this observation runs counter the
claim that the multihoming side faces high prices, it is perfectly compatible with the competitive
bottleneck model.
For the sake of concreteness, we assume that the seller side is the side of the market which
potentially can multihome, while buyers always singlehome. Our main findings are as follows.
When going from singlehoming to multihoming on one side, prices on both sides of the market
always move in opposite directions. It is not necessarily the case that sellers pay a higher fee
and buyers, a lower fee; the opposite may occur because sellers may pay a low price to start
with in the competitive bottleneck case. Platforms prefer to impose exclusivity to sellers (i.e.,
to prevent them from multihoming) if the sellers’ intrinsic value (the difference between their
stand-alone benefit and the marginal cost of accommodating them) is not too large. There
exist configurations of parameters for which this condition is always, or never, satisfied. Buyers
tend to prefer the competitive bottleneck environment when they value a lot the presence of
sellers and sellers find it profitable to multihome; they are then more likely to interact with a
larger set of buyers and to be charged lower fees. However, it may also happen that platforms
charge higher fees to buyers when sellers multihome than when they singlehome, and that this
negative price effect outweighs the positive participation effect, leading buyers to prefer the
two-sided singlehoming environment. As for sellers, if they perceive the two platforms as more
differentiated and if they exert weaker cross-group effects on buyers, then they are more likely
to be better off in the competitive bottleneck case.
Combining these findings, we obtain three important insights about how the surplus effects
play out for the three groups. First, the resulting market outcome may have the feature that
buyers, sellers and platforms are all better off when sellers are allowed to multihome. Second,
2Evans, Hagiu, and Schmalensee (2006) made the same point.
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whenever platforms benefit from imposing exclusivity, they necessarily hurt buyers and possibly
also sellers. Thus, in an environment with potential seller multihoming, an agency should
prohibit the use of exclusivity of the seller side if its aim is to maximize buyer surplus. Third,
whenever buyers suffer from seller multihoming, platforms and sellers benefit from it.
While comparing a two-sided singlehoming model to a competitive bottleneck model is an
interesting exercise, it may appear to be of little practical relevance because singlehoming on both
sides is observed in only few market environments. We want to challenge this view. First, while
multihoming may be feasible for some users on one side, it may well be the case that due to habits
or other latent factors a fraction of users does not consider the possibility of multihoming. Then,
a comparison between two-sided multihoming and the competitive bottleneck is an extreme
version of a comparison between markets in which such habits and other latent factor are present
and those in which they are not. Second, the present comparison informs policy makers about
possible effects when taking actions to enable multihoming or prohibiting exclusive dealing for
a fraction of sellers (or, in the flip side of the model, of buyers). The former may take the form
of aggregators combining the functionalities and listings by both platforms.
There exists surprisingly little work that studies the competitive effects of multihoming,
despite the policy debate about means to encourage multihoming. In the seminal paper by
Armstrong (2006) both market environments—that is, two-sided single-homing and competitive
bottleneck—are analyzed in detail, but no comparison is undertaken. We follow his approach of
considering platforms that are horizontally differentiated on both sides of the market and charge
access fees to each side.
As an alternative, platforms may charge transaction fees, as analyzed in Rochet and Tirole
(2003). For an insightful discussion of the use of different price instruments, see Rochet and
Tirole (2006). While it would be interesting, to extend our analysis to other price instruments,
we restrict attention to access fees, which is the natural assumption to make when platforms
cannot monitor transactions.
Armstrong and Wright (2007) endogenize the multihoming decision of buyers and sellers.
In their setting, the competitive bottleneck model emerges endogenously as one side decides
not to multihome along the equilibrium path. They, as well as the rest of the literature, do
not look at the surplus effects of the possibility of multihoming. In general, there exists little
work on surplus effects in markets with two-sided platforms. An exception is Anderson and
Peitz (2017)—they evaluate surplus effects of policy interventions in the competitive bottleneck
world.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first lay out the model (Section 2)
and solve it when both sides singlehome (Section 3) and when one side is allowed to multihome
(Section 4). We are then in a position to derive our main results by comparing the two settings
(Section 5). After showing that our results are robust to a more general formulation of the
utility of multihomers (Section 6), we propose some concluding remarks (Section 7).
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2 The model
Two platforms compete to facilitate the interaction between a unit mass of sellers and a unit
mass of buyers, with this interaction generating positive cross-group external effects. Following
Armstrong (2006), we assume that platforms compete in membership fees and that buyers and
sellers perceive them as horizontally differentiated. Horizontal differentiation is modeled in the
Hotelling fashion: platforms are located at the extreme points of the unit interval and face
constant costs cs and cb for each additional seller and buyer, respectively; sellers and buyers are
uniformly distributed on this unit interval and incur an opportunity cost of visiting a platform
that increases linearly in distance at rates τ s and τ b, respectively.
We assume the following form of interaction between buyers and sellers on a platform: buyers
purchase one unit of the perfectly differentiated product offered by each seller who is active on
the platform; each trade generates a benefit bb for the buyer and a profit bs for the seller.
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Buyers and sellers also derive a stand-alone benefit from visiting a platform; we assume that
these benefits are equal across platforms and we note them rb and rs. Letting n
i
b and n
i
s denote
the mass of buyers and sellers active on platform i, and noting mib and m
i
s the membership fees
that platform i charges buyers and sellers, we can express buyer and seller surpluses of visiting
platform i (gross of any opportunity cost) as
vis = rs + n
i
bbs −mis and vib = rb + nisbb −mib.
We consider a two-stage game in which platforms i ∈ {1, 2} set membership fees on each side
of the market, mis, m
i
b, simultaneously in stage 1 and buyers and sellers simultaneously make their
subscription decisions in stage 2. We compare different settings for stage 2 according to whether
participants in one or the other group choose at most one platform (i.e., to ‘singlehome’) or also
have the option to be active on both platforms (i.e., to ‘multihome’). We solve for subgame-
perfect equilibria and will restrict attention to parameter constellations such that both platforms
will be active in equilibrium (we will provide precise assumptions below).
As a benchmark, consider the case that cross-group external effects are zero—i.e., bb = bs = 0.
Thus, if participants on a particular side are singlehoming, we solve the standard Hotelling model
and obtain cg + τ g as equilibrium price on side g ∈ {b, s}, provided that there is full market
coverage. This requires that rg − τ g/2− (cg + τ g) > 0 or, equivalently, rg − cg > (3/2)τ g holds.
If participants are multihoming, their choice of buying from one platform is independent of
the pricing of the other platform, and each platform solves a monopoly problem. Solving the
first-order condition of profit maximization when the marginal consumer is in the interior of the
[0, 1]-interval, we obtain the price (rg + cg)/2. At this price, the marginal consumer is indeed
in the interior if rg − τ g − (rg + cg)/2 < 0, which is equivalent to rg − cg < 2τ g. In this case,
the price under multihoming is less than under singlehoming if and only if (rg + cg)/2 < cg + τ g
or, equivalently, rg − cg < 2τ g. To summarize, for (3/2)τ g < rg − cg < 2τ g, the price under
3It is assumed, quite realistically, that in a seller–buyer relationship, prices or terms of transaction are inde-
pendent of the membership fee that applies to buyers and sellers.
4
multihoming—which coincides with the monopoly price in a single-product monopoly problem—
is less than the price under singlehoming—which coincides with the standard Hotelling duopoly
problem. The reason for this counterintuitive result is that the firm faces a more elastic demand
when the consumers’ outside option is a constant rather than the competitor’s offer (which
becomes increasingly attractive when the firm wants to reach consumers located further away)—
that is, the same price cut leads to a larger increase in the demand in the monopoly than in the
duopoly setting.
3 Two-sided singlehoming
In this section we consider a market environment in which both sides of the market singlehome.
Our aim is to characterize the equilibrium in which both platforms are active.4
If buyers and sellers singlehome, the seller and the buyer who are indifferent between the
two platforms are respectively located at xs and xb such that v
1
s − τ sxs = v2s − τ s (1− xs) and
v1b − τ bxb = v2b − τ b (1− xb). It follows that n1s = xs, n2s = 1− xs, n1b = xb, and n2b = 1− xb and
the total number of each side’s agents on the two platforms adds up to 1: n1s +n
2
s = n
1
b +n
2
b = 1.
Combining the indifference equations together with the expressions of vis and v
i
b, we obtain the
following expressions for the numbers of buyers and sellers at the two platforms: n
i
s
(
nib
)
= 12 +
1
2τs
(
(2nib − 1)bs − (mis −mjs)
)
,
nib
(
nis
)
= 12 +
1
2τb
(
(2nis − 1)bb − (mib −mjb)
)
.
(1)
Solving this linear equation system, we derive the equilibrium number of buyers and sellers at
stage 2 as a function of the membership fees:
nis(m
i
s,m
j
s,m
i
b,m
j
b) =
1
2
+
bs(m
j
b −mib) + τ b(mjs −mis)
2(τ bτ s − bbbs) ,
nib(m
i
s,m
j
s,m
i
b,m
j
b) =
1
2
+
bb(m
j
s −mis) + τ s(mjb −mib)
2(τ bτ s − bbbs) .
Platform i chooses mis and m
i
b to maximize Π
i =
(
mis − cs
)
nis (·) +
(
mib − cb
)
nib (·). At the
symmetric equilibrium (m1s = m
2
s ≡ ms and m1b = m2b ≡ mb), the first-order conditions can be
written as {
ms = cs + τ s − bbτb (bs +mb − cb),
mb = cb + τ b − bsτs (bb +ms − cs).
The equilibrium membership fee for the sellers is equal to marginal costs plus the product-
differentiation term as in the standard Hotelling model, adjusted downward by the term bbτb (bs+
mb−cb). As pointed out by Armstrong (2006), to understand this term, note from expression (1)
that each additional seller attracts bb/τ b additional buyers. These additional buyers allow the
intermediary to extract bs per seller without affecting the sellers’ surplus. In addition, each of
4Our analysis follows Armstrong (2006). A textbook treatment can be found in Belleflamme and Peitz (2015).
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the additional bb/τ b buyers generates a margin of mb− cb to the platform. Thus bbτb (bs+mb− cb)
represents the value of an additional buyer to the platform. The same holds on the buyers’ side.
Solving the system of first-order conditions (with full participation) gives explicit expressions
for equilibrium membership fees (where the superscript 2S denotes ‘two-sided singlehoming’):
m2Ss = cs + τ s − bb and m2Sb = cb + τ b − bs.
We observe that the equilibrium membership fee for one group is equal to the usual Hotelling
formulation (marginal cost plus transportation cost) adjusted downward by the cross-group
external effect that this group exerts on the other group (see Armstrong, 2006).
As platforms set the same fees at equilibrium, the indifferent participants of both sides are
located at 1/2, meaning that n2Ss = n
2S
b = 1/2. It follows that in equilibrium, a seller and a
buyer obtain, respectively, a surplus (gross of their transport cost) given by
v2Ss = hs +
1
2bs − τ s + bb and v2Sb = hb + 12bb − τ b + bs,
where hg ≡ rg − cg denotes the difference between the stand-alone benefit and the cost of
accommodating a participant of side g ∈ {b, s}. Thus sellers’ and buyers’ aggregate surpluses
are calculated respectively as
PS2S = v2Ss − 2
∫ 1
2
0
τ sxdx = hs − 54τ s + 12bs + bb,
CS2S = v2Sb − 2
∫ 1
2
0
τ bxdx = hb − 54τ b + 12bb + bs.
Finally, equilibrium profits are the same for both platforms and are computed as
Π2S = 12(τ b + τ s − bb − bs).
They are increasing in the degree of product differentiation on both sides of the market (as
in the Hotelling model) and decreasing in the buyers’ and sellers’ surplus for each transaction,
i.e., the magnitude of the cross-group external effects. The intuition for the latter result is the
following: as cross-group external effects increase, platforms compete more fiercely to attract
additional agents on each side as they become more valuable.
A series of conditions have to be met for the previous equilibrium to be valid. First, the
second-order conditions of the profit-maximization program are τ bτ s > bbbs and 4τ bτ s > (bb +
bs)
2. Both conditions require that the transportation cost parameters τ b and τ s (which measure
the horizontal differentiation between the two platforms) are sufficiently large with respect to the
gains from trade bb and bs (which measure the cross-group external effects). These conditions
are also sufficient to have a unique and stable equilibrium in which both platforms are active.
We check that the former condition makes sure that the number of members of one group at
one platform, nis (·) or nib (·), decreases not only with the membership fee that they have to pay
but also with the membership fee that the other group has to pay on this platform.5 We also
5For stronger cross-group external effects and/or weaker horizontal differentiation (i.e., for bbbs > τ bτs), the
number of agents on one platform would be an increasing function of their membership fee and the market would
tip; i.e., all buyers and sellers would choose the same platform.
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observe that the latter condition is more restrictive than the former. Furthermore, we need to
guarantee full participation on the two sides; that is, the indifferent participant on each side
(located at 1/2) must have a positive net surplus at equilibrium: on the seller side, v2Ss − 12τ s > 0
or 2hs > 3τ s − bs − 2bb; on the buyer side v2Sb − 12τ b > 0 or 2hb > 3τ b − bb − 2bs. In sum, we
make the following set of assumptions for the two-sided singlehoming case.
Assumption 1 In the two-sided singlehoming case, parameters satisfy
4τ bτ s > (bb + bs)
2 (Soc2S)
2hs > 3τ s − bs − 2bb (FPs2S)
2hb > 3τ b − bb − 2bs (FPb2S)
4 Multihoming on one side (competitive bottlenecks)
Suppose now that sellers have the possibility to multihome (i.e., to be active on both platforms
at the same time), while buyers continue to singlehome. We assume that the decision whether
to subscribe to one platform is independent of the decision whether to subscribe to the other
platform. In particular, if a seller x is subscribed to both platforms his surplus is rs + n
1
bbs −
m1s − τ sx + rs + n2bbs −m2s − τ s(1 − x) = 2rs + bs − τ s − (m1s + m2s), which is independent of
his location. According to our assumption, a multihoming seller enjoys the stand-alone benefit
on both platforms—i.e., platforms are symmetric but provide different services leading to stand-
alone benefits that can be combined when multihoming.6
Sellers can be divided into three subintervals on the unit interval: those sellers located “on
the left” register with platform 1 only, those located “around the middle” register with both
platforms, and those located “on the right” register with platform 2 only. At the boundaries
between these intervals, xi0, we find the sellers who are indifferent between visiting platform i
(i ∈ {1, 2}) and not visiting this platform. Their locations are found as, respectively, x10 such
that rs + n
1
bbs −m1s = τ sx10, and x20 such that rs + n2bbs −m2s = τ s (1− x20). We assume for
now that 0 < x20 < x10 < 1 (we provide necessary and sufficient conditions below), so that
n1s = x10 and n
2
s = 1− x20, with the multihoming sellers being located between x20 and x10. As
far as buyers are concerned, we have the same situation as in the previous section. The number
of buyers and sellers visiting each platform are thus respectively given by
nib =
1
2
+
bb(n
i
s − njs)− (mib −mjb)
2τ b
and nis =
rs + n
i
bbs −mis
τ s
.
Solving this system of four equations in four unknowns, we obtain buyers’ and sellers’ partici-
pation as a function of subscription fees and the parameters of the model,
nib =
1
2
+
bb(m
j
s −mis) + τ s(mjb −mib)
2 (τ bτ s − bbbs) ,
nis =
bs
τ s
(
1
2
+
bb(m
j
s −mis) + τ s(mjb −mib)
2 (τ bτ s − bbbs)
)
+
rs −mis
τ s
.
6This assumption differs form Armstrong and Wright (2007) who assume that the services that give rise to the
stand-alone utility are the same on both platforms. We discuss the implications of our assumption in Section 6.
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The maximization problems of the two platforms are the same as above. Platform 1’s best
responses are implicitly defined by the first-order conditions, which can be expressed as
m1b =
− (bb + bs)m1s + bbm2s + τ sm2b − bs (bb − cs) + τ s (τ b + cb)
2τ s
,
m1s =
− (bb + bs) τ sm1b + bbbsm2s + bsτ sm2b − bsbb (bs + cs + 2rs) + bbτ scb + (bs + 2cs + 2rs) τ bτ s
2 (2τ bτ s − bbbs) .
Solving the previous system of equations, we find the equilibrium membership fees, which are
equivalent for both platforms (with the superscript CB standing for ‘competitive bottleneck’):
mCBs =
1
2 (rs + cs) +
1
4(bs − bb),
mCBb = cb + τ b − bs4τs (bs + 3bb + 2rs − 2cs) .
On the seller side, platforms have monopoly power. If the platform focused only on sellers, it
would charge a monopoly price equal to (rs + cs) /2+bs/4 (assuming that each seller would have
access to half of the buyers and, therefore, would have a gross willingness to pay equal to bs/2).
We observe that this price is adjusted downward by bb/4 when the cross-group effect that sellers
exert on the buyer side is taken into account. Similarly, on the buyer side, platforms charge the
Hotelling price, cb + τ b, less a term that depends on the size of the cross-group effects and on
the parameters characterizing the seller side (rs, cs, and τ s).
It is useful to compare price changes in the competitive bottleneck model to those in the two-
sided singlehoming model. We observe that the equilibrium membership fee for sellers is increas-
ing in the strength of the cross-group effect in the competitive bottleneck model (∂mCBs /∂bs > 0),
whereas it is constant in the two-sided singlehoming model. This is due to the monopoly pricing
feature on the multihoming side. Everything else equal, if sellers are multihoming, the platform
operators directly appropriate part of the rent generated on the multihoming side by setting
higher membership fees. This is not the case in the singlehoming world, where the membership
fee does not react to the strength of the network effect on the same side since platforms compete
for sellers (and buyers).
At equilibrium, seller and buyer participation is
nCBb =
1
2 and n
CB
s =
1
4τs
(bb + bs + 2hs) .
This allows us to compute the equilibrium net surplus of sellers and buyers (gross of transporta-
tion cost and for one platform) as:
vCBs =
1
4(bb + bs + 2hs),
vCBb =
1
4τs
(b2b + 4bsbb + b
2
s + 2 (bb + bs)hs) + hb − τ b.
Note that vCBs is the per-platform seller’s surplus (gross of transport costs).
7 We observe that
vCBs and v
CB
b are increasing in the net gain of the other side and in the net gain of the own side.
7Sellers located between 1 − nCBs and nCBs multihome and, therefore, earn a surplus of 2vCBs . On the other
hand, vCBs is the surplus earned by the sellers located between 0 and 1 − nCBs , who choose to visit platform 1
only, and by the sellers located between nCBs and 1, who choose to visit platform 2 only.
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Aggregated over all buyers, in equilibrium, buyers’ surplus is
CSCB = vCBb − 2
∫ 1/2
0
τ bxdx =
1
4τs
((bb + bs) (bb + bs + 2hs) + 2bbbs) + hb − 54τ b.
Aggregated over all sellers, in equilibrium, sellers’ surplus is computed as (using the definitions
of nCBs and v
CB
s ):
PSCB =
∫ 1−nCBs
0
(vCBs − τ sx)dx+
∫ nCBs
1−nCBs
(2vCBs − τ s)dx+
∫ 1
nCBs
(vCBs − τ s (1− x))dx
= 1τs
(
vCBs
)2
= 116τs (bb + bs + 2hs)
2 .
We observe that the aggregated seller surplus is decreasing in the degree of platform differenti-
ation on the seller side, increasing in the stand-alone benefit on the seller side, and increasing
in cross-group external effects on both sides.
The platforms’ equilibrium profits are
ΠCB = 116τs (8τ bτ s − (bb + bs)2 − 4bbbs + 4h2s).
As above, a set of conditions need to be satisfied for this equilibrium to hold. The second-
order conditions are here τ bτ s > bbbs and 8τ bτ s > (bb + bs)
2 + 4bbbs, the second condition being
more stringent than the first. Note that the latter condition implies that even if platforms do
not offer stand-alone utilities (hs = rs − cs = 0), equilibrium profits are strictly positive. These
conditions also guarantee that a unique and stable equilibrium exists in which both platforms
share the market—in short, sharing equilibrium. We also impose that some (but not all) sellers
multihome at equilibrium (if some sellers multihome, this also implies that all sellers participate).
This is the case if 1/2 < nCBs < 1, which is equivalent to 2τ s < bs + bb + 2hs < 4τ s. Finally,
all buyers must be willing to participate; i.e., rb + n
CB
s bb −mCBb − 12τ b > 0 which is equivalent
to 4τ shb + 2 (bb + bs)hs > 6 (τ sτ b − bsbb) − (bb − bs)2. We collect all these conditions in the
following assumption.
Assumption 2 In the competitive bottleneck case (with multihoming sellers), parameters satisfy
8τ bτ s > (bb + bs)
2 + 4bbbs (SocCB)
2hs > 2τ s − bs − bb (FPsCB)
2hs < 4τ s − bs − bb (ShsCB)
4τ shb + 2 (bb + bs)hs > 6 (τ sτ b − bsbb)− (bb − bs)2 (FPbCB)
Comparing conditions in Assumptions 1 and 2, we note the following. First, the second-
order conditions are less demanding in the competitive bottleneck case than in the two-sided
singlehoming case; that is, if (Soc2S) is satisfied, so is (SocCB). Second, for τ s > bb, full
participation of sellers is guaranteed in the competitive bottleneck case if full participation is
guaranteed in the two-sided singlehoming case; that is, if (FPs2S) is met, then so is (FPsCB).
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5 Singlehoming vs. multihoming
In this section, we compare the sharing equilibrium of the two previous environments. Thus,
the sets of assumptions 1 and 2 have to hold. Regrouping them, we impose:8
4τ bτ s > (bb + bs)
2
hb > max
{
1
2 (3τ b − bb − 2bs) , 14τs
(
6 (τ sτ b − bsbb)− (bb − bs)2 − 2 (bb + bs)hs
)}
hmins ≡ max
{
1
2 (2τ s − bs − bb) , 12 (3τ s − bs − 2bb) , 0
}
< hs < h
max
s ≡ 12 (4τ s − bs − bb)
To start with, we ask when a sharing equilibrium can be supported in the two environ-
ments. The relevant assumption regarding the relationship between platform differentiation and
cross-group external effects is (Soc2S) with two-sided singlehoming market and (SocCB) in the
competitive bottleneck market. As mentioned above, the former implies the latter. This con-
firms the claims that a sharing equilibrium is more “likely” to arise in a competitive bottleneck
environment than in a two-sided singlehoming environment. We now examine in turn the prices,
the platform profits, and the surpluses of the participants.
5.1 Prices
We recall that in the model in which sellers multihome, platforms hold an exclusive access to
their set of singlehoming buyers (the ‘bottleneck’), which makes buyers valuable to extract profits
on the seller side. Platforms then set monopoly prices on the multihoming side and low (and
possibly even negative prices) on the singlehoming side, as has been pointed out by Armstrong
(2006). In other words, we expect platforms to compete fiercely for buyers (singlehomers) and,
in return, to milk sellers (multihomers). Hence, we may expect lower prices on the buyer side
and higher prices on the seller side when compared to the two-sided singlehoming model. We
call this the ‘bottleneck effect’.
However, prices charged to sellers in the competitive bottleneck model may be low to start
with and competition may well afford positive margins in the two-sided singlehoming environ-
ment. As stated in the following lemma, it depends on the parameters whether sellers pay a
lower prices in the competitive bottleneck model. Comparing prices, the bottleneck effect does
not necessarily dominate (there are parameter configurations that satisfy all our assumptions
for either case). In addition, when moving from singlehoming to multihoming on one side, prices
on both sides of the market always move in opposite directions.
Lemma 1 Allowing sellers to multihome increases the fee paid by sellers and decreases the fee
paid by buyers, mCBs > m
2S
s and m
CB
b < m
2S
b , if and only if 2hs + bs + bb > 4τ s − 2bb. The
opposite happens—that is, mCBs > m
2S
s and m
CB
b < m
2S
b —if and only if the left-hand and the
right-hand side of the inequality are reversed—that is, 2hs + bs + bb < 4τ s − 2bb. Both cases are
compatible with the conditions imposed on the parameters in Assumptions 1 and 2.
8It is the third line—linking the values of hs, τs, bs, and bb—that will be crucial to derive our results. Given
the values of these parameters, it is always possible to find values of hb and τ b that satisfy the first two lines.
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Proof. The proof follows directly from computing the difference between the seller and the
buyer fees in the two cases:
mCBs −m2Ss = 12 (rs + cs) + 14 (bs − bb)− (cs + τ s − bb)
= 14 [(2hs + bs + bb)− (4τ s − 2bb)] ,
mCBb −m2Sb = cb + τ b − bs4τs (3bb + bs + 2rs − 2cs)− (cb + τ b − bs)
= bs4τs [(4τ s − 2bb)− (2hs + bs + bb)] .
As for the compatibility with Assumptions 1 and 2, we recall that conditions (FPs2S),
(FPsCB) and (ShsCB) impose that max {2τ s, 3τ s − bb} < 2hs+bs+bb < 4τ s. Clearly, 4τ s−2bb <
4τ s. Moreover, if τ s > bb, then 4τ s − 2bb > max {2τ s, 3τ s − bb}.
Based on the intuition that sellers have to pay monopoly prices in the competitive bottleneck
model and that platforms compete in this case fiercely on the multihoming side, we would
consider mCBs > m
2S
s and m
CB
b < m
2S
b as the “natural” outcome. However, we have shown
above, in the benchmark case with no cross-group effects, that the monopoly price (corresponding
to the competitive bottleneck model) is always lower than the duopoly price (corresponding to
the two-sided singlehoming model). This is because a drop in the fee on the seller side is more
effective to expand the number of sellers when they are multihoming (in which case, the offer
of a platform competes against the outside option, just as in the monopoly problem) instead
of singlehoming (in which case, the offer of a platform competes against the rival’s offer, just
as in the standard duopoly problem). This result still holds in the borderline case in which
only sellers are subject to a positive cross-group external effect (bs > 0 and bb = 0): we indeed
check that mCBs −m2Ss = 14 (2hs + bs − 4τ s) < 0 by virtue of condition (ShsCB), which becomes
2hs < 4τ s − bs in this particular case. It follows that the “natural” outcome can occur only if
the buyers’ utility increases with the number of sellers (bb > 0).
5.2 Platform incentives
What are the platforms’ incentives regarding single- vs multihoming? This is not a rhetorical
question, as platforms may be able to use non-price strategies to prevent participants from
multihoming. For instance, a platform may impose exclusivity on sellers and, thus, force them to
become singlehomers. How do platform profits depend on exclusivity? To answer this question,
we compare equilibrium profits:
ΠCB −Π2S = [(mCBb − cb)nCBb + (mCBs − cs)nCBs ]− [(m2Sb − cb)n2Sb + (m2Ss − cs)n2Ss ]
= 12
(
mCBs −m2Ss
) (
1− bsτs
)
+
(
nCBs − 12
) (
mCBs − cs
)
.
where the second line uses our previous results, namely nCBb = n
2S
b = n
2S
s =
1
2 , n
CB
s > 1/2
and mCBb − m2Sb = − (bs/τ s)
(
mCBs −m2Ss
)
. We see that if, for instance, sellers pay a higher
fee in the competitive bottleneck case and this fee is larger than marginal cost (mCBs > m
2S
s
and mCBs > cs) while τ s > bs, then all terms are positive, meaning that platforms make higher
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profits when sellers can multihome. Conversely, still in the case where τ s > bs, if platforms
subsidize sellers in the competitive bottleneck case (mCBs < cs) and set a lower fee than in the
two-sided singlehoming case (mCBs < m
2S
s ), then all terms are negative and platforms prefer to
prevent sellers from multihoming.
To formalize this intuition, we use the values of mCBs , m
2S
s and n
CB
s to compute
ΠCB −Π2S = 4h
2
s + 8 (bb + bs) τ s − 8τ2s −
(
b2b + 6bbbs + b
2
s
)
16τ s
.
A sufficient condition for ΠCB > Π2S is 8 (bb + bs) τ s − 8τ2s −
(
b2b + 6bbbs + b
2
s
)
> 0 (as we
assume hs > 0). This polynomial in τ s has two positive roots, (bb + bs) /2±
√
2 (bb − bs) /4, and
is positive if τ s is comprised between the two roots. Otherwise, we have that
ΠCB < Π2S ⇔ hs < 12
√
8τ2s − 8 (bb + bs) τ s +
(
b2b + 6bbbs + b
2
s
) ≡ hΠs .
Recalling that 2hs < 4τ s − bb − bs according to condition (ShsCB), we observe that the latter
inequality is always satisfied if τ s <
√
bbbs/2.
9 We record our results in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 If −√2 |bb − bs| < 4τ s − 2bb − 2bs <
√
2 |bb − bs|, then platforms are always willing
to allow sellers to multihome. In contrast, if τ s <
√
bbbs/2, then platforms are always willing to
prevent sellers from multihoming. Outside this regions of parameters, platforms prefer to allow
sellers to multihome if and only if hs > h
Π
s .
5.3 Participants’ surpluses
In this subsection we compare the aggregate surplus of buyers and sellers in the two environ-
ments. In particular, we want to know to whether buyers’ and sellers’ preferences aligned or
misaligned regarding the multihoming of sellers. Our previous discussion about equilibrium fees
points at a major source of misalignment, as fees move in opposite directions: when sellers pay
lower fees in the competitive bottleneck case, buyers pay lower fees in the two-sided singlehoming
case, and vice versa. However, participants also care about the number of agents of the other
group they can interact with, and these numbers also differ in the two environments. First, as
nCBs > 1/2, there are more sellers active on a platform under multihoming than under single-
homing, thus adding value to participation on the buyer side. Second, multihoming sellers have
access to all buyers, which may positively affect their surplus (even if they pay twice the fees and
the transportation costs). Thus, we need to examine how the effects of price and participation
balance one another.
Buyers. For buyers, we have vCBb − v2Sb = (nCBs − 1/2)bb −
(
mCBb −m2Sb
)
. The first term
is the participation effect and is clearly positive, as multihoming brings more sellers on each
9It is readily checked that τs <
√
bbbs/2 < min
{
(bb + bs) /2−
√
2 (bb − bs) /4, (bb + bs) /2 +
√
2 (bb − bs) /4
}
.
Recall also that parameters must satisfy condition (Soc2S), i.e., 4τ bτs > (bb + bs)
2, which can be rewritten as
2τ2s >
(
(bb + bs)
2/ (2τ b)
)2
. This condition is compatible with τs <
√
bbbs/2 as long as τ b > (bb + bs)
2/(2
√
bbbs).
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platform; the second is the price effect and, as we have seen above, it can be either negative (if
mCBb > m
2S
b ) or positive. At the aggregate level, CS
CB = vCBb − τ b/4 and CS2S = v2Sb − τ b/4
imply that CSCB −CS2S = vCBb − v2Sb . Using the definition of nCBs and the expression derived
above for mCBb −m2Sb , we can write
CSCB − CS2S =
[
1
4τs
(2hs + bb + bs)− 12
]
bb − bs4τs [(4τ s − 2bb)− (2hs + bs + bb)] .
It is clear that the participation effect (the first term) increases with the strength of the cross-
group effect that sellers exert on buyers (bb), and with the equilibrium number of sellers in
the competitive bottleneck case, which is itself an increasing function of hs and a decreasing
function of τ s (more sellers decide to multihome when their intrinsic benefits are larger and
when transportation costs are smaller). It can be checked that an increase in bb or hs, or a
decrease in τ s also reduce the importance of the price effect (the second term), thereby making
it unambiguously more likely that CSCB > CS2S .10
Developing the previous expression, we find
CSCB > CS2S ⇔ hs > 4τ s − bs − bb
2
− bb bs + τ s
bs + bb
≡ hbs.
It is readily checked that the latter inequality is more likely to be satisfied when bb increases
or when τ s decreases, which confirm our previous intuition. Recall that conditions (FPs2S),
(FPsCB) and (ShsCB), together with hs > 0, impose
hmins ≡ max
{
1
2 (2τ s − bs − bb) , 12 (3τ s − bs − 2bb) , 0
}
< hs < h
max
s ≡ 12 (4τ s − bs − bb) .
It is clear that hbs is less than the upper bound. Hence, there always exist admissible values of hs
that are sufficiently large for consumers to prefer that sellers be allowed to multihome. However,
parameters may be such that hbs is also less than the lower bound, implying that buyers prefer
sellers to multihome for any admissible value of hs. This is so, for instance, if bb > bs, i.e., if
buyers value more the interaction with sellers than vice versa. We formalize these findings in
the next lemma (which is proved in Appendix 8.1).
Lemma 3 If bb > bs or if bs > bb and τ s <
(
b2b + 4bbbs + b
2
s
)
/ (2 (bb + 2bs)) ≡ τmins , then buyers
are always better off when sellers are allowed to multihome (CSCB > CS2S). Otherwise (i.e.,
for bs > bb and τ s > τ
min
s ), they may prefer that sellers be forced to singlehome (CS
2S > CSCB)
for small values of hs = rs − cs (i.e., for hmins < hs < hbs).
In summary, Lemma 3 shows that we can expect consumers to welcome the possibility for
sellers to multihome, because it gives them access to a larger set of sellers with whom they can
interact, and it may even lead platforms to charge them lower fees. This is all the more likely
that they value a lot the presence of sellers and that sellers find it profitable to multihome.
We provide sufficient conditions for this to be only possible outcome. However, it may happen
that platforms charge higher fees to buyers when sellers multihome than when they singlehome,
and that this negative price effect outweighs the positive participation effect—if this is the case,
buyers prefer that platforms actually prevent seller multihoming.
10The net effect of a change in bs is ambiguous.
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Sellers. For singlehoming sellers, we have vCBs − v2Ss = m2Ss − mCBs ; here, there is no par-
ticipation effect, as buyers equally split between the two platforms in both environments; and
we have seen above that the price difference can go both ways. As for multihoming sellers, we
focus on the one located at the middle of the Hotelling line for whom the surplus difference is
equal to 2vCBs − τ s − (v2Ss − τ s/2) = rs + (bs − τ s) /2 −
(
2mCBs −m2Ss
)
. Developing the latter
expression, we find that this seller is better off in the competitive bottleneck environment than
in the singlehoming environment if and only if τ s > bb.
11
At the aggregate level, we recall the expressions derived in Sections 3 and 4:
PSCB = 1τs
(
vCBs
)2
= 116τs (bb + bs + 2hs)
2 ,
PS2S = v2Ss − 14τ s = hs − 54τ s + 12bs + bb.
It follows that
PSCB > PS2S ⇔ 4h2s − 4 (4τ s − bb − bs)hs + 20τ2s − 8 (2bb + bs) τ s + (bb + bs)2 > 0.
If τ s > 2bb, this polynomial in hs has no real root in which case it can be shown that it is
positive everywhere, meaning that PSCB > PS2S . Otherwise, for τ s < 2bb, the polynomial has
two real roots. The larger roots is equal to 12 (4τ s − bs − bb) +
√
τ s (2bb − τ s). Recalling that
our parameter restrictions impose that hs < h
max
s =
1
2 (4τ s − bs − bb), we immediately see that
this root lies above the upper bound of the admissible range. As for the lower root, we denote
it
hss ≡ 12 (4τ s − bs − bb)−
√
τ s (2bb − τ s).
As established in the following lemma (see Appendix 8.2 for the formal proof), the inequality
hss > h
min
s must hold unless τ s is sufficiently small. Then, we have that PS
CB > PS2S for hs < h
s
s
and PSCB < PS2S otherwise. In the cases in which hss < h
min
s , we have that PS
CB < PS2S for
all admissible parameter configurations.
Lemma 4 If τ s > 2bb, then sellers are always better off when they are allowed to multihome
(PSCB > PS2S). In contrast, for sufficiently small values of τ s, sellers are always better off
when they are prevented from multihoming (PSCB < PS2S). For intermediate values of τ s,
sellers prefer to multihome if hs < h
s
s, and to singlehome otherwise.
According to Lemma 4, sellers’ preferences regarding multihoming crucially depend on the
ratio between the degree of platform differentiation, τ s, and the strength of cross-group effects
that sellers exert on buyers, bb: the larger this ratio—that is, the larger τ s and/or the smaller
bb—the more likely it is that sellers are better off in the competitive bottleneck case. This stands
in sharp contrast with what we observed for buyers, who are more likely to prefer that sellers
singlehome when τ s increase and/or bb decrease. Thus, we have identified here an important
11Recall that under this condition, full participation of sellers is guaranteed in the competitive bottleneck case
if full participation is guaranteed in the two-sided singlehoming case—i.e., condition (FPs2S) implies condition
(FBsCP).
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source of divergence between the preferences of buyers and sellers. However, this does not exclude
the existence of parameter configurations such that buyers and sellers agree, as we discuss in
the following subsection.
5.4 Surplus comparisons: The complete picture
To close this section, we superimpose the results of Lemmas 2–4, so as to measure the extent
to which platforms, buyers and sellers agree or disagree with respect to the benefits from seller
multihoming. There are a priori eight possible scenarios. In the next proposition, we eliminate
three of them by proving a clear divergence between buyers on one side, and sellers and platforms
on the other side (the proof is relegated to Appendix 8.3).
Proposition 1 Whenever buyers prefer that sellers be forced to singlehome (CS2S > CSCB),
both sellers and platforms prefer the opposite (PSCB > PS2S and ΠCB > Π2S).
Proposition 1 leaves us with four other scenarios. The first two scenarios correspond to the
conventional wisdom: CSCB > CS2S and PS2S > PSCB; that is, the possibility of multihoming
is beneficial for the side that continues to singlehome, but harmful for the side that is allowed
to multihome. Then, platforms may have higher profits in either environment: they will please
sellers if they choose to impose exclusivity, and please buyers otherwise.
In the last two scenarios, both buyers and sellers are better off in the competitive bottleneck
environment: CSCB > CS2S and PSCB > PS2S . Again, platforms may prefer one or the other
environment. Here, if they impose exclusivity (which can only occur if bb > bs), they hurt both
groups; otherwise, the possibility of multihoming for sellers is welfare improving as it makes all
parties better off. We summarize our findings in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 (1) Whenever platforms find it preferable to impose exclusivity, they necessarily
hurt at least one group of participants. (2) It is possible that buyers, sellers and platforms are
all better off when sellers are allowed to multihome.
Proof. The first part directly follows from Proposition 1, as buyers and sellers never agree
that exclusivity would make them all better off. To show the existence of the other configura-
tions, we build numerical examples. First, take bb > bs and τ s > 2bb, so that respectively buyers
and sellers always prefer the competitive bottleneck environment. Set bb = 40, bs = 10 and
τ s = 85. Then, we have h
Π
s = 83.516 while h
min
s = 82.5 and h
max
s = 145. For hs = 83, we check
that ΠCB − Π2S = −43/170 < 0, in which case platforms would impose exclusivity, thereby
hurting both buyers and sellers. In contrast, for hs = 85, we have Π
CB − Π2S = 25/34 > 0, in
which case all parties agree that the competitive bottleneck environment is preferable.
We summarize our results in Table 1 and Figure 1. Table 1 shows the five possible com-
binations of preferences for the three parties—buyers, sellers, and platforms (‘CP’ indicates a
preference for the competitive bottleneck case, ‘2S’ for the two-sided singlehoming case). In the
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last column of the table, we indicate the zones of Figure 1 that correspond to the various com-
binations (the left panel corresponds to the case in which bb > bs and the right panel, to the
case in which bs > bb).
Buyers Sellers Platforms Zones in Figure 1
CB 2S 2S 1, 5
CB 2S CB 2, 6
CB CB CB 3, 7
CB CB 2S 4
2S CB CB 8
Table 1. Preferred market environments
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Figure 1: Surplus effects of seller multihoming
We conclude that without further information, a competition authority or regulator cannot
know whether allowing multihoming on one side (with the other side singlehoming) leads to
higher or lower net surpluses on either side. It is, therefore, a priori not possible to say whether
the side that changes its behavior from singlehoming to multihoming (or reverse) benefits or
suffers from this change of behavior.
6 Extension: Stand-alone benefits when multihoming
We propose here a more general formulation of the competitive bottleneck problem by assuming
that a multihoming seller enjoys a total stand-alone benefit equal to (1 + ρ) rs. We let the
parameter ρ take any value between 0 and 1 to cover any situation regarding the services that
give rise to the stand-alone utility. At one extreme (ρ = 1), we have the case considered so
far in this paper: platforms provide completely differentiated services. At the other extreme
(ρ = 0), we have the case analyzed by Armstrong and Wright (2007): platforms provide exactly
the same services, so that joining a second platform does not generate any extra stand-alone
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benefit. In this section, we consider the whole spectrum between these two extremes. Our goal
is to show that our results still hold under this more general formulation and that our main
message is even reinforced—that is, the conventional wisdom about the effects of multihoming
cannot be trusted. As the analysis follows the same steps as in Section 4, we skip most of the
developments.
Derivation of equilibrium. The sellers who are indifferent between visiting platform i (i ∈
{1, 2}) and visiting both platforms are now identified by
x1m = 1− 1
τ s
(
ρrs + n
2
bbs −m2s
)
and x2m =
1
τ s
(
ρrs + n
1
bbs −m1s
)
.
As above, we assume that 0 < x1m < x2m < 1, so that n
1
s = x2m and n
2
s = 1 − x1m. Noting
that nothing changes for buyers, we can proceed in the same way as in Section 4: we solve for
buyers’ and sellers’ participation levels and then use these expressions to derive the platforms’
profits as functions of the four fees. Solving the systems of the four first-order conditions, we
find the following equilibrium fees and equilibrium participation, where hs,ρ stands for ρrs − cs
(note that hs,ρ = hs = rs − cs for ρ = 1):
mcbb = cb + τ b −
bs
4τ s
(bs + 3bb + 2hs,ρ) ,
mcbs = cs +
1
2hs,ρ +
1
4 (bs − bb) ,
ncbb =
1
2 and n
cb
s =
1
4τs
(bb + bs + 2hs,ρ) .
From there, we can compute the equilibrium net surplus of sellers and buyers (gross of trans-
portation costs) as:
vshs =
1
4 (bb + bs) +
1
2 ((2− ρ) rs − cs) ,
vmhs =
1
2 (bb + bs) + (rs − cs) ,
vcbb =
1
4τs
(b2b + 4bsbb + b
2
s + 2 (bb + bs)hs,ρ) + hb − τ b,
where vshs denotes the surplus for singlehoming sellers (i.e., sellers located between 0 and 1−ncbs ,
who choose to visit platform 1 only, and sellers located between ncbs and 1, who choose to visit
platform 2 only) and vmhs the surplus for multihoming sellers (i.e., sellers located between 1−ncbs
and ncbs ). Note that v
mh
s = 2v
sh
s − (1− ρ) rs—that is multihoming sellers earn less than twice
the surplus of singlehoming sellers because of the possible duplication between the stand-alone
benefits provided by the two platforms. For the special case ρ = 1 (no duplication), vmhs = 2v
sh
s ,
as postulated in Section 4.
Aggregated over all buyers, in equilibrium, buyers’ surplus is
CScb = 14τs ((bb + bs) (bb + bs + 2hs,ρ) + 2bbbs) + hb − 54τ b.
Aggregated over all sellers, in equilibrium, sellers’ surplus is
PScb =
∫ xcb1m
0
(vshs − τ sx)dx+
∫ xcb2m
xcb1m
(vmhs − τ s)dx+
∫ 1
xcb2m
(vshs − τ s (1− x))dx
= 116τs (bb + bs + 2hs,ρ)
2 + (1− ρ) rs.
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Finally, the platforms’ equilibrium profits are computed as
Πcb = 116τs (8τ bτ s −
(
b2s + b
2
b + 6bsbb
)
+ 4h2s,ρ).
It is easily seen that the conditions of Assumption 2 guarantee that this equilibrium holds
for any value of ρ (the conditions become more stringent as ρ increases).
Multihoming vs. singlehoming. We observe that the expressions for the equilibrium prices,
participations, buyers’ surplus and platforms’ profits are isomorphic to the ones obtained in
Section 4: we just need to replace hs by hs,ρ. As hs,ρ ≤ hs, we can immediately conclude that
mcbb ≥ mCBb , mcbs ≤ mCBs , ncbs ≤ nCBs , CScb ≤ CSCB, and Πcb ≤ ΠCB.
Thus, the more similar the services provided by the platforms (i.e., the smaller ρ), the higher the
fee charged to buyers and the lower the fee charged to sellers; there are also fewer multihoming
sellers, which results in a lower surplus for buyers and lower profits for platforms. The impact
on sellers is less obvious, since an additional term appears in PScb. We compute
PScb − PSCB = 14τs (bb + bs + hs,ρ + hs) (hs,ρ − hs) + (1− ρ) rs
= (1− ρ) rs
(
1− 14τs (bb + bs + hs,ρ + hs)
)
= (1− ρ) rs
(
1− nCBs + (1− ρ)
rs
4τ s
)
≥ 0.
Hence, sellers obtain a higher surplus as ρ decreases.
The previous results suggest than when comparing the competitive bottleneck and the two-
sided singlehoming environments, it is more likely, as ρ decreases, that sellers prefer the former,
while buyers and platforms prefer the latter. Hence, a larger duplication of stand-alone benefits
(i.e., a lower ρ) further undermines the conventional wisdom, according to which the possibility
of multihoming should hurt the side that can multihome (here, sellers) while benefiting the other
side.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have reconsidered the classic Armstrong (2006) two-sided platform setting
with the aim to analyze the impact of multihoming on one side on prices, platform profits, and
buyer and seller surplus. The competitive bottleneck world is described as a world in which
the multihoming side has to pay monopoly prices and platforms compete on the singlehoming
side. However, this does not imply that the multihoming side were to pay lower prices if it could
not multihome. We recall the three main insights regarding the surplus platforms, buyers, and
sellers obtain. (i) Whenever buyers prefer that sellers be forced to singlehome, both sellers and
platforms prefer the opposite. (ii) Whenever platforms find it preferable to impose exclusivity,
they necessarily hurt at least one group of participants. (iii) It is possible that buyers, sellers
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and platforms are all better off when sellers are allowed to multihome. All our findings are easily
reformulated if the buyer instead of the seller side is the side that may be able to multihome.
Future work may look into alternative settings to address the effect of multihoming. This
appears to be a worthwhile endeavour given the inclination of some competition authorities and
regulators to encourage and facilitate multihoming.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Lemma 3
We first note that
hbs >
1
2 (2τ s − bs − bb)⇔ τ s > bb,
hbs >
1
2 (3τ s − bs − 2bb)⇔ (τ s − bb) (bs − bb) > 0,
hbs > 0⇔ τ s >
b2b + 4bbbs + b
2
s
2 (bb + 2bs)
≡ τmins .
(1) Take bb > bs. (1a) If τ s > bb, then h
min
s =
1
2 (3τ s − bs − 2bb) and we see from the middle
line above that hbs < h
min
s . (1b) If (bb + bs) /2 < τ s < bb, then h
min
s =
1
2 (2τ s − bs − bb) and
we see from the top line above that hbs < h
min
s . (1c) If τ s < (bb + bs) /2, then h
min
s = 0 and as
τmins > (bb + bs) /2 when bb > bs, we have again, from the bottom line above, that h
b
s < h
min
s . (2)
Take bs > bb. (2a) If τ s > (bs + 2bb) /3, then h
min
s =
1
2 (3τ s − bs − 2bb) and as (bs + 2bb) /3 > bb
when bs > bb, we have that h
b
s < h
min
s from the middle line above. (2b) If τ s < (bs + 2bb) /3,
hmins = 0 and as τ
min
s < (bs + 2bb) /3, we have that h
b
s > h
min
s for τ s < τ
min
s .
8.2 Proof of Lemma 4
We first establish the sign of C ≡ 20τ2s−8 (2bb + bs) τ s+(bb + bs)2. This quadratic form in τ s has
real roots provided that 11b2b + 6bbbs − b2s > 0, which is guaranteed if bs < 7.45bb. If bs > 7.45bb,
C > 0 for all τ s. If bs < 7.45bb, then the two roots, which we note τ
−
s and τ
+
s , are such that
0 < τ−s =
1
5 (2bb + bs)− 110
√
11b2b + 6bbbs − b2s < τ+s = 15 (2bb + bs)+ 110
√
11b2b + 6bbbs − b2s < 2bb.
So, C is positive for τ s < τ
−
s or τ s > τ
+
s , and negative otherwise. We now rewrite the condition
PSCB > PS2S as 4h2s−4 (4τ s − bb − bs)hs+C > 0. For this quadratic form to have real roots, we
need 4 (4τ s − bb − bs)2−4C = 16τ s (2bb − τ s) > 0, or τ s < 2bb. If τ s > 2bb, then C > 0, implying
that PSCB > PS2S . Consider now the case where τ s < 2bb. There are then two positive roots:
hss ≡ 12 (4τ s − bs − bb)−
√
τ s (2bb − τ s) and 12 (4τ s − bs − bb) +
√
τ s (2bb − τ s) > hmaxs . Clearly,
hss > 0 if and only if C > 0. So, in case h
s
s > h
min
s , then PS
CB > PS2S if hs < h
s
s, whereas
PSCB < PS2S otherwise. If hss < 0, then PS
CB < PS2S for all admissible hs > h
s
s. We still
need to compare hss to h
min
s . We have that
hss >
1
2 (2τ s − bs − bb)⇔ τ s > bb,
hss >
1
2 (3τ s − bs − 2bb)⇔ (τ s − bb) (5τ s − bb) > 0.
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(1) Take bb > bs. (1a) If τ s > bb, then h
min
s =
1
2 (3τ s − bs − 2bb) and we see from the bottom
line above that hss > h
min
s . (1b) If (bb + bs) /2 < τ s < bb, then h
min
s =
1
2 (2τ s − bs − bb) and
we see from the top line above that hss < h
min
s . (1c) If τ s < (bb + bs) /2, then h
min
s = 0; as
τ−s < (bb + bs) /2 < τ+s , we have that hss > hmins for τ s < τ−s and hss < hmins for τ−s < τ s <
(bb + bs) /2. (2) Take bs > bb. (2a) If τ s > (bs + 2bb) /3, then h
min
s =
1
2 (3τ s − bs − 2bb) and as
(bs + 2bb) /3 > bb when bs > bb, we have that h
s
s > h
min
s from the bottom line above. (2b) If
τ s < (bs + 2bb) /3, h
min
s = 0; as τ
−
s < τ
+
s < (bs + 2bb) /3, we have that h
s
s > h
min
s for τ s < τ
−
s
and τ+s < τ s < (bs + 2bb) /3, whereas h
s
s < h
min
s for τ
−
s < τ s < τ
+
s . Collecting the previous
results, we have that hss < h
min
s in which case PS
CB < PS2S for all admissible parameters if
either bb > bs and τ
−
s < τ s < bb or bs > bb and τ
−
s < τ s < τ
+
s .
8.3 Proof of Proposition 1
From Lemma 3, we know that for buyers to prefer that sellers singlehome, we must have bs > bb,
τ s > τ
min
s , and h
min
s < hs < h
b
s. (1) We first show that in that case, sellers prefer the possibility
of multihoming. Suppose not. We know from Lemma 4 that for sellers to prefer two-sided
singlehoming, we must have hs > h
s
s. So, it must be that h
s
s < hs < h
b
s. However, h
b
s > h
s
s is
incompatible with bs > bb and τ s > τ
min
s :
hbs > h
s
s ⇔ 12 (4τ s − bs − bb)− bb
bs + τ s
bs + bb
> 12 (4τ s − bs − bb)−
√
τ s (2bb − τ s)
⇔ τ s (2bb − τ s)−
(
bb
bs + τ s
bs + bb
)2
= (bb − τ s)
τ s
(
2b2b + b
2
s + 2bbbs
)− bbb2s
(bb + bs)
2 > 0.
But for bs > bb, we have
τmins =
b2b + 4bbbs + b
2
s
2 (bb + 2bs)
> bb >
bbb
2
s
2b2b + b
2
s + 2bbbs
.
So, τ s > τ
min
s ⇒ τ s > bb and τ s >
bbb
2
s
2b2b + b
2
s + 2bbbs
⇒ hss > hbs
It follows that τ s > τ
min
s and hs < h
b
s imply that hs < h
s
s and sellers prefer multihoming, a
contradiction. (2) We now show that bs > bb, τ s > τ
min
s , and h
min
s < hs < h
b
s also imply
that platforms prefer the competitive bottleneck environment. By contradiction, suppose that
platforms prefer the two-sided-singlehoming environment. From Lemma 2, we know we need
K ≡ 8τ2s − 8 (bb + bs) τ s +
(
b2b + 6bbbs + b
2
s
)
> 0 and hmins < hs < h
Π
s . For bs > bb, we have
both K > 0 and hΠs > h
min
s if and only if τ s <
1
2 (bb + bs) − 14
√
2 (bs − bb) ≡ τmaxs . Yet, it is
easily shown that bs > bb implies that τ
max
s < τ
min
s . It follows that for bs > bb and τ s > τ
min
s ,
the inequality hΠs < h
min
s must hold and, therefore, that platforms prefer to allow sellers to
multihome.
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